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ABSTRACT
Managerial decisions on the adoption of innovative technologies by a firm are made under conditions of 
uncertainty and must account for network externalities that imply the benefit of a technology is received 
not only from its intrinsic payoff, but also from the size of the network of other adopters. The theoretical 
model presented in this study demonstrates that for firms evaluating information technology investment 
with network effects key determinants of the technology selection pattern are adoption reversibility 
and switching costs. If switching costs are sufficiently high to make technology adoption irreversible 
then safer established technologies have an advantage as choosing a riskier untested technology opens 
the firm to the risk of being stranded without a network of followers. With lower switching costs, the 
technology adoption decision is reversible which provides an advantage to riskier untested technologies. 
A discussion of empirical evidence on adoption patterns in information technology provides application 
for the theoretical model.
Keywords: Information technology; technology adoption; switching costs; reversible decisions.
Manuscript first received: 2017/Apr/09. Manuscript accepted: 2017/Oct/08
Address for correspondence:
Dmitriy V. Chulkov, Professor of Economics and Management Information Systems in the School of Business at Indiana University 
Kokomo, Indiana, USA. E-mail: dchulkov@iuk.edu
JISTEM USP, Brazil   Vol. 14, No. 3, Sep/Dec., 2017, pp. 309–321
Chulkov, D. V.310
www.jistem.fea.usp.br 
INTRODUCTION
In the information technology (IT) area, managerial decisions on adoption of new innovative 
technologies face a number of challenges. The process of technological innovation is characterized 
by inherent uncertainty. Investments in new technologies have varied levels of risk as newer 
innovative technologies that offer improved performance may also offer a lower likelihood of 
successful development (Krishnan and Bhattacharya, 2002). Furthermore, IT adoption decisions may 
be influenced by choices of other economic agents. With a network externality, the benefit to a firm of 
choosing a technology consists of its intrinsic payoff plus the “network” value from others adopting 
the same technology (Farrell and Saloner, 1986; Katz and Shapiro, 1986). 
Research on technology adoption in management information systems (MIS) identified several 
conceptual models and general frameworks for such decisions including the technology acceptance 
model (TAM) and the unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (Venkatesh et al., 2003, 
2012; Gangwar et al., 2014; Roy, 2017) as well as specific variables and success factors that influence 
adoption behavior (e.g. Kamal, 2006; Ghezzi et al., 2013). Meanwhile, a different approach prevailed 
in the area of economic analysis that focused on mathematical modeling of specific cause-and-effect 
relationships in the technology adoption process. The purpose of this study is to extend the economic 
theories on technology adoption when network externalities are present, specifically for the case of 
information technology. The focus is on identifying the role of switching costs and reversibility of the 
technology choices made by the firm.
A prominent example of adapting the economic analysis of network externalities to IT 
investment decisions is presented by Au and Kauffman (2001) who model technology adoption for the 
electronic bill presentment and payment (EBPP) industry. Their model considers a firm’s irreversible 
choice between two competing technologies – a safer established technology, and a riskier unproven 
technology that may ultimately turn out to be superior.  The study of Au and Kauffman shows that 
firms are more likely to adopt the safer existing technology, even though the untested technology may 
be superior. These results follow from the assumption that information technology adoption by the 
firm is not reversible, and once chosen a technology will be continually used. This assumption was 
originally proposed in the models of technology adoption by Choi (1997) as well as Choi and Thum 
(1998). 
Case study evidence, however, suggests that technology choice in IT does not have to be 
irreversible, and firms may change their technology decisions and switch to alternative technologies 
by incurring switching costs. One case study of choosing between a safer and a riskier technology 
is provided by Krishnan and Bhattacharya (2002). The case involves Dell computer manufacturer 
selecting the technology for portable computer batteries. The safer option was to use the tested nickel-
metal-hybrid (NiMH) batteries, while the riskier option was the lithium-ion technology (LIon). The 
technology choice was not irreversible, as Dell could change the design of its laptops by incurring a 
switching cost. The riskier but ultimately more promising LIon technology was selected in this case. 
The size of switching costs is identified as a key factor influencing the technology adoption pattern in 
recent empirical studies (e.g. Zhou et al., 2015).
The main contribution of this study is an original theoretical model that significantly extends 
the existing studies of Choi (1997) as well as Au and Kauffman (2001). While these studies suggest 
that there is an advantage to selecting the safer technology, the model constructed below identifies 
how with sufficiently low switching costs there are benefits to selecting the riskier technology which 
was the ultimate outcome in the Dell case as discussed by Krishnan and Bhattacharya (2002). 
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Unlike the broader conceptual models of technology acceptance and use (TAM and UTAUT), 
the economic model constructed below focuses on the specific relationship between the IT technology 
selection pattern at the organizational level and the ease of switching between technologies after the 
adoption decision has been made. The analytical results also provide managerial implications for 
IT decision makers. They suggest that a firm selecting between technological solutions that do not 
involve irreversible commitments will see a benefit of trying a riskier untested technology. In contrast, 
if switching costs are sufficiently high and effectively make the adoption decision irreversible, then a 
safer technology provides an advantage to the firm. This reinforces the central role of the switching 
cost structure in IT adoption decisions. 
The article is organized as follows. The next section presents a review of the relevant literature 
and defines key concepts for the development of the theoretical model. Section 3 presents the 
analytical model of technology choice with network externalities and different levels of switching 
costs. A discussion of empirical evidence on network externalities and switching costs in IT industries 
follows in Section 4. The final section reviews managerial implications and provides a conclusion.
LITERATURE REVIEW
This study complements two separate strands of research on technology adoption. In the 
economic literature, adoption of new technologies is explored through theoretical models that focus on 
mathematical modeling of the impact of various factors on the timing of technology choices made by 
the firm (Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Choi and Thum, 1998; Farzin et al., 1998; Hagspiel et al., 2015). In 
contrast, the MIS literature focuses on conceptual models including the technology acceptance model 
(TAM) and the unified theory of acceptance and use of technology – UTAUT (Venkatesh et al., 2003). 
TAM focuses on factors such as perceived usefulness and ease of use in determining an individual’s 
attitude toward and use of IT. UTAUT integrates key factors including expected performance of 
the new technology, effort, and social influences, with moderating variables such as age, gender, 
experience, and voluntariness. These conceptual MIS models are then explored empirically as the 
impact of specific variables that influence technology adoption behavior is identified (Venkatesh et 
al., 2012; Kamal, 2006; Ghezzi et al., 2013; Roy, 2017).
The two modeling approaches – economic models and conceptual models of TAM and UTAUT 
– are complementary as they address different aspects of the technology adoption decision. Economic 
models are fundamentally based on the analysis of costs and benefits and focus on the best interest 
of the firm. TAM and UTAUT models explore the acceptance and ultimate use of new technologies.
Network Externalities and Technology Adoption
Information technology adoption is typically affected by network externalities because the 
benefits to a firm from choosing a technology come not only from its intrinsic payoff but also from 
the “network” value that accrues when others adopt the same technology (Farrell and Saloner, 1985; 
Katz and Shapiro, 1992). Having a large network of users that also employ the same technology 
provides external value – positive network externality – to the firm. These network externalities are 
particularly prevalent in software, apps, social media and communication networks (Brynjolfsson 
and Kemerer, 1996; Gallaugher and Wang, 2002; Strader et al., 2007; Tucker, 2008; Wattal et al., 
2010; Zhou et al., 2015). Infrastructure networks such as ATM machine networks and electronic data 
interchange systems (Kauffman et al., 2000) also exhibit network externalities.
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Classic economic studies on network externalities provide insight into the pattern of technology 
adoption in industries that face such network effects. Farrell and Saloner’s “lock-in” argument 
(Farrell and Saloner, 1985, 1986) suggests that the presence of a dominant installed base can inhibit 
the introduction of new technologies. Buyers exhibit “excess inertia” in their choice of technology 
arising from the unwillingness to forego the current network externalities from existing technology. 
In contrast, the economic models of Katz and Shapiro (1986, 1992) exhibit the opposite behavior 
labeled “insufficient friction” that involves a tendency to adopt emerging technologies. In such 
models, forward-looking buyers of durable products favor new technologies in anticipation that 
the new technology will provide access to future network externalities. These models identify how 
potential network benefits affect the technology adoption decision and outcomes.
Switching Costs and Reversibility after Technology Adoption
Another key factor that affects IT adoption and investment decisions is cost. In addition to 
the monetary cost of the different technology options, there is also the cost of switching between 
alternative technologies once a technology has been selected. When a firm selects a new IT solution, 
and later decides to switch to a different IT solution, such decision involves a switching cost. This cost 
is higher when different hardware or software options are incompatible and additional investment in 
software, hardware, and training has to be incurred. 
Switching costs effectively can make the technology adoption decision either reversible or 
irreversible. When the costs of switching from the selected IT solution to the alternative technology 
option are sufficiently high, technology adoption becomes irreversible.
Choi (1997) as well as Choi and Thum (1998) demonstrate that when switching costs are high, 
firms may be locked-in into a less-advanced technology. Au and Kauffman (2001) model technology 
adoption at a financial firm that faces network externalities for the electronic bill presentment and 
payment (EBPP) technology. In their model, billers are more likely to adopt the safer existing billing 
technology, even though the new untested technology may later prove to be superior. In this case, 
firms are cognizant of both potential network benefits and switching costs. If a firm selects a new 
technology solution, and that solution proves to be inferior, then no other firms will use the same 
technology and there will be no network benefits. In this scenario, when switching costs are high, 
such a firm may be prevented from reversing its failed technology selection and switching to the 
alternative technology that has network benefits. Therefore, a firm selects the technology that already 
has a strong network of users from the start and avoids new emerging technologies that have no 
established network of users. Au and Kauffman’s results follow from the assumption that switching 
costs are high and therefore the technology adoption decision is final and irreversible. 
In the following section, the impact of switching costs on the technology adoption decision is 
explored in detail. The theoretical model presented below relaxes the assumptions made in earlier 
economic models of Choi (1997), Choi and Thum (1998), as well as Au and Kauffman (2001), and 
demonstrates that while high switching costs may lead to firms selecting technologies that already 
have a strong network of users, with low switching costs the opposite results are observed. The 
incentive to try riskier untested technologies is enhanced with low switching costs, as the benefits of a 
network will still be available to the user through switching if the selection of an untested technology 
leads to the realization of a lower payoff value. This finding extends the existing economic models 
and complements the conceptual models such as TAM and UTAUT by demonstrating the impact of 
the economic factor of switching costs on technology adoption.
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SEQUENTIAL-CHOICE TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION MODEL
The objective of this section is to consider the implications of different levels of switching 
costs on technology adoption with two alternative and incompatible technologies when network 
effects are associated with using the selected technology. This study extends the extant research to 
allow for different levels of switching costs, thus relaxing the assumption of the irreversibility of 
technology choice made in earlier studies such as Choi (1997), Choi and Thum (1998), as well as Au 
and Kauffman (2001). The discussion in this section presents the analytical model and is purposefully 
kept at an abstract level.  
As a brief introduction to the economic model fully developed below, consider the sequential 
choice of two firms between two alternative information technologies or systems, respectively A 
and B. There is uncertainty about the payoff of each technology. Suppose the first firm has chosen 
technology A. The payoff to choosing A is then realized and observed. When the second firm compares 
the benefits of choosing A versus B, the payoff of technology B is still uncertain. When the switching 
costs are sufficiently high to make the technology choice irreversible, the second firm fears becoming 
stranded without a network of followers if the realization of technology B’s payoff is inferior to A’s. 
If switching costs are low, then the second firm may opt to try technology B because the option of 
switching back to the tested technology A is still available by paying the switching cost. 
Let us now explore the model more formally. Suppose that adopting technology A provides the 
firm with intrinsic value α as well as the return related to the final size of adoption network nv  if n of 
the N firms adopt technology A.  Similarly, adopting technology B provides return of nv+β  if n of 
the N firms adopt B.  Returns α and β are randomly drawn from certain distribution functions F and 
G, respectively. Table 1 provides a summary of the modeling notation.
Table 1. Description of the Modeling Notation
Notation Description
A Technology A
B Technology B
α Intrinsic payoff of technology A
β Intrinsic payoff of technology B
vn
Return related to the final size of adoption network if N firms adopt a given technology 
(i.e. v1 if 1 firm adopts the technology)
CA Cost of switching from technology A
CB Cost of switching from technology B
Technologies A and B can be considered “experience goods” in that the value of a technology 
is discovered only after it has been selected. This value is revealed to all firms when one firm adopts 
the technology.  There is a finite cost Ci of switching from technology i, and firms cannot delay their 
adoption decisions.
We start by considering a benchmark case with no network effects. Then, we describe the case 
of high switching costs and network externalities that is designed to replicate the earlier findings of 
Choi (1997) as well as Au and Kauffman (2001). We then relax the assumption of the irreversible 
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technology adoption that was present in these earlier studies and move on to consider the results for 
medium switching cost, and low switching cost cases in order to summarize the impact of switching 
costs on optimal technology adoption decisions.
High Switching Costs and No Network Externalities
Suppose the first firm adopt technology A, and realizes value α.  For the moment, assume that the 
switching cost is sufficiently large so that firms adopting technology A will not find it advantageous 
to switch to the alternative technology. Without network externalities 1 1( . . . 0)−= = = =N Nv v v the 
second, risk neutral decision-maker will choose technology B if its expected value, ( ),βE  is greater 
than the realized value of technology A. Further, the second decision-maker will not subsequently 
switch from B to A if the cost of switching is sufficiently large, namely if ( α β> −BC ), where β  
is the lower bound on the distribution of values for technology B. In this case, the likelihood of 
technology B being considered is given by F E( ( ))β , the probability that the realized value for α falls 
below the expected value of B. 
High Switching Costs and Network Externalities
Now let us consider the case when network externalities are present such that 1 1. . . 0−> > > =N nv v v . 
 Again let us assume that the first firm chooses technology A.  Further assume that the ( )α β< E e cost 
of switching from B to A is sufficiently high to rule out the second decision-maker switching, namely 
that βα −−+> )( 1vvC NB . In this case, the second firm will hesitate to select technology B, as all 
other firms will choose A if the realized value of technology B has a comparatively low return,β α< , 
resulting in the second firm forgoing the benefit of network externalities. In this situation, the second 
firm adopts technology B only if the following condition (1) is satisfied.
NN vvGE +>−+ − ααβ ]))[(1()( 1                                                (1)
This replicates the main finding of Choi (1997). Note that the above net gain to choosing 
technology B is decreasing in α. Equation (2) defines the unique value of *α  below which the net 
gain to adopting B is positive.
* *
1 1( ) ( ) ( )α β α− −= − − −N N NE v v G v                                                 (2)
Several conclusions follow from (2). Firstly, technology B may not be adopted even when it has 
a comparatively high expected value so that . This contrasts with the case of no network externalities 
in which B is always adopted when it has a higher expected value. Secondly, a mean-preserving 
increase in the spread of the distribution of returns for technology B indicating a more risky return 
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will reduce the likelihood of adopting B as it increases the likelihood of missing out on network 
externalities.  
Medium Switching Costs and Network Externalities
Now let us focus on the implications of lower switching costs for moving from technology B 
to A. Suppose this cost exceeds the maximum gain from network externalities so that 1vvC NB −> , 
but is not sufficiently large to rule out switching if the realized value of payoff β is very low, such 
that βα −−+< )( 1vvC NB . This medium level of switching costs means that the second firm must 
perform a different calculation in deciding when to adopt technology B rather than A after the first 
firm has selected A. The second firm now adopts technology B if the following condition holds.
                           (3)
The first term on the left indicates the expected return if technology B is shown to be superior 
to A, and all subsequent firms follow the selection of B. The second term on the left indicates the 
expected return if αβ <  in which case no one follows the second firm, but BNs Cvv −−+=≥ )( 1αββ  
so that it is not advantageous for the second firm to switch to technology A that is used by other 
adopters. The final term on the left is the gain to the second firm switching back to A after a low 
realization for technology B’s payoff. 
Low Switching Costs and Network Externalities
Finally, consider the case with network externalities if the cost of switching from B is less than 
the gain in network externalities, such that )( 1vvC NB −≤ . Then the second firm adopts technology B 
if the following condition holds.
                  (4)
Note that if αβ ≥ , all subsequent firms will adopt technology B. If β α< , then the second firm 
will switch to technology A given the switching costs from B to A are outweighed by the network gains 
when all subsequent firms choose A. In this case, the net gain to choosing B is given by equation (5). 
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    (5)
Note that the above net gain to choosing technology B is decreasing in α. There is a unique α* 
defined by equation (6) at which the net gain is zero.
                                           (6)
Several conclusions follow from (6). Firstly, technology B may be adopted even though its 
expected value is below the realized value of A, αβ <)(E . This outcome would occur even without 
network externalities. Secondly, a mean-preserving increase in the spread of distribution G increases 
the likelihood that the firm will investigate technology B. The conclusions reported in the high 
switching costs case are thus reversed. 
Application of the Model
The theoretical results above have important implications for IT decision-makers. In considering 
a project with switching costs that are sufficiently high to make the adoption decision irreversible, 
the firm would be better off in selecting the tested technology choice already selected by others. If 
switching costs are low, and the IT investment decision is therefore reversible, then the firm benefits 
from exploring riskier technology choices. Thus, the economic model demonstrates the impact of 
switching costs and the reversibility of the IT adoption decision on the type of technology selected. 
In order to illustrate the implications of the model, let us explore a number of case studies 
focusing on technology adoption and the reversibility of technology choice. First, Lee et al. (2003) 
discuss the microprocessor market, and note that the switching costs for advanced users of server 
hardware are lower compared with the switching costs in the personal computer (PC) market. This 
implies that switching between alternative microprocessor technologies is easier in the server market 
and more difficult in the PC market. Lee et al. describe that the riskier reduced instruction set (RISC) 
technology became dominant in the server market, while the safer complete instruction set (CISC) 
technology continued in the personal computer market. The difference in switching costs contributed 
to the ultimate technology choice by the firms in the way predicted by the theoretical model with the 
safer technology becoming dominant in the setting of high switching costs and the riskier technology 
succeeding in the market with lower switching costs. 
Second, Krishnan and Bhattacharya (2002) discuss the technology choices of laptop battery 
design by Dell Computer. The “safe” option was to use the tested and 100-percent operational nickel-
metal-hybrid (NiMH) batteries, while the risky option was the lithium-ion technology (LIon). The 
chances for success of the LIon technology at the time of the decision were evaluated at only 60-percent. 
The technology choice was not irreversible, as only 30-percent of work on laptop design would 
have needed to be redone. While prior models (Choi, 1997; Au and Kauffman, 2001) suggested an 
advantage to the safer technology, the theoretical model presented above shows that with sufficiently 
low switching costs there are benefits to trying the risky technology. This was the outcome in the Dell 
case. 
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Third, Brynjolfssen and Kemerer (1996) describe the spreadsheet software market in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, and note that a key switching cost component was the operating system change from 
DOS to Windows. Existing software written for the DOS operating system had high switching costs 
for the users, and the dominant Lotus office software exhibited a large price premium. Economy-wide 
switch to the Windows operating system reduced the switching cost for spreadsheets and office suites 
as firms already switching to Windows no longer had legacy commitments. Lower switching costs 
provided an advantage to the emerging Microsoft spreadsheet and office software and reduced the 
market dominance of the entrenched Lotus spreadsheets. The outcome of this case is again consistent 
with the theoretical model.  
EVIDENCE ON SWITCHING COSTS IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
INVESTMENT
Studies of investment in information technology and information systems have paid much 
attention to network externalities in technology adoption as benefits of IT often depend on the installed 
base. A number of both long-established and recent studies provide empirical evidence on network 
externalities in various sectors of IT industries. Kauffman et al. (2000) find support for network 
externalities in electronic banking. Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) empirically demonstrate the 
presence of network externalities in the spreadsheet software market, while Gallaugher and Wang 
(1999, 2002) demonstrate the degree of payoff externalities in the browser/server software market. 
More recently, the issue of network externalities has been also considered in social media and 
communication networks (Wattal et al., 2010), e-mail and internet messaging (Strader et al., 2007; 
Zhou et al., 2015), as well as video-messaging (Tucker, 2008). 
As was mentioned above, a key assumption in the existing theoretical models of technology 
adoption with network externalities is the irreversibility of technology choice. However, case studies 
demonstrate that the option of reversing technology adoption decision at some switching cost may 
change the outcome. Empirical studies of network externalities in IT do not focus specifically on 
potential switching costs of technology adoption, however these studies provide some evidence on the 
nature of technology options and switching costs in different markets. This evidence is summarized 
in Table 2. 
A review of the literature demonstrates a variety of switching cost experiences in IT. 
Comparatively low switching costs are described by Krishnan and Bhattacharya (2002) in the Dell 
battery technology case, Bhattacherjee et al. (2012) in the web browser market, Zhou et al. (2015) 
in the mobile instant messaging market. In contrast, high switching costs are described by Arora et 
al. (2010) in a study of internet applications and LAN-based operating systems, as well as Augereau 
and Greenstein (2001) in a study of the adoption of 56K modems. Kauffman et al. (2000) describe 
varied technology adoption costs for ATM networks, while Matzler et al. (2015) examine the impact 
of varied switching costs on the customer satisfaction with IT.
Varied experiences of these IT markets with the costs of switching after a technology has 
been adopted demonstrate that the assumption of high switching costs that make technology choice 
irreversible does not describe the entire economy. Even within the same product market, the magnitude 
of switching costs may shape the market outcome. Lee et al. (2003) note that relating the theoretical 
predictions on network externalities to the empirical research and case studies in IT is difficult as the 
existing theories do not provide guidance on the determinants of firm’s preference regarding the risk 
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level of technology within one model’s framework. The theoretical model presented in the previous 
section extends the literature by removing the irreversibility assumption and incorporates uncertainty 
in technology adoption decisions to demonstrate the role of switching costs in forming the adoption 
decision towards either the riskier or the safer technology. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This study presents an original theoretical model that provides new analytical results on the 
role of switching costs and reversibility in the adoption decisions for IT markets that exhibit network 
externalities. As a firm considers the adoption decision for new technologies that yield uncertain 
payoffs and are subject to network externalities, the irreversible adoption case means that safer 
tested technologies have an advantage. With low switching costs, however, the technology adoption 
decision is reversible and there is a benefit to trying a riskier untested technology that may prove to 
be superior. This analytical result extends the existing economic models of technology adoption and 
complements such conceptual models as TAM and UTAUT by describing the impact of the economic 
factor of switching cost.
The model provides clear managerial implications for the MIS and IT decision makers. It 
suggests that firms considering technological solutions that do not involve irreversible commitment 
will see a benefit of selecting riskier untested technologies. If switching costs are sufficiently high 
to make the adoption decision irreversible, then safer technology provides an advantage to the firm.
Several directions for future research may be identified as the theoretical model provides clear 
predictions that may be tested empirically. Existing empirical studies of network externalities in 
Table 2. Evidence on Network Externalities and Switching Costs in IT
IT Market Source(s) Switching Costs
Spreadsheets, Windows OS Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) Low
Business Computers Tam and Hui (2001) Low
Laptop Batteries Krishnan and Bhattacharya (2002) Low
RISC Processors Lee et al. (2003) Low
Web Browsers Bhattacherjee et al. (2012) Low
Mobile Instant Messaging Zhou et al. (2015) Low
Electronic Payment Networks (ATM) Kauffman et al. (2000) Varied
Automated Payment Systems (ACH) Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004) Varied
B2B Computer Services Matzler et al. (2015) Varied
Spreadsheets, DOS OS Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) High
Operating Systems Koski (1999) High
Modems Augereau and Greenstein (2001) High
CISC Processors Lee et al. (2003) High
Local Area Networks (LAN) Corrocher and Fontana (2008) High
Internet applications and LAN OS Arora et al. (2010) High
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the MIS literature have not focused on the specific issue of reversibility in IT adoption. However, 
the empirical evidence reviewed above describes varied experiences across IT markets in the scale 
of switching costs and the reversibility of technology choices made by the firms. A systematic 
identification of empirical data that allows for testing of the theory is an area of future research. This 
work may be complemented by performing simulation exercises designed to illustrate the workings 
of the theoretical model. Recent economic experiments explored the role of switching costs in 
technology adoption (Keser et al., 2012) suggesting that the findings of this study may also be tested 
experimentally.
Innovation in IT involves uncertainty about the payoff from investment and the level of 
risk associated with selecting each of the available technology options. Network externalities are 
encountered in a wide variety of IT settings. Innovation funding and investment decisions in these 
cases would benefit from a better understanding of the impact of decision reversibility and switching 
costs on technology adoption and investment.
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